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Public Perceptions of Gender Bias in




How are women on the bench, and their decisions, perceived by
the public? Many scholars find that gender influences the voting
behavior of judges and the assessment ofjudges by state judicial systems
and the American Bar Association. However, few scholars have
examined how judge gender affects the way in which the public responds
to judicial outcomes. Does the public perceive the decisions of female
state court judges as being "biased" by their gender identity, particularly
in cases involving reproductive rights/family law? Also, does the public
view female judges on state courts as more likely to rely on ideology when
ruling in cases? Using a survey experiment hat varies judge gender in a
state child custody case, we examine whether respondents exhibit less
support for judicial decisions authored by female state court judges.
Additionally, we test whether respondents are more likely to perceive the
decisions of female state court judges as ideologically biased or as a
product of gender influences (as compared to male judges). Finally, we
assess whether these effects are conditional on or exacerbated by
respondent characteristics uch as gender, race, and religiosity. The
influence of gender on public response to state court decisions has
important implications for our understanding of why certain court
decisions find public support and acceptance.
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INTRODUCTION
Does judge gender affect how the public responds to state court
decisions? The judicial community has long identified the existence of
gender bias in the legal system and has made some progress in
understanding and addressing this issue, partially through the use of
gender bias task forces in many states and federal circuits in the late
twentieth century.' Additionally, over the past two decades, state courts
of all levels have seen increases in gender diversity.2 Multiple factors
underlie the call for increasing gender representation of the judiciary.
Enhancing descriptive representation3 on the bench, at the very least,
1. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, What Judges Can Learn from Gender Bias Task Force Studies,
81 JUDICATURE 15 (1997) (discussing court decisions and task force studies that highlight biased
treatment of women); Kimberly A. Lonsway et al., Understanding the Judicial Role in Addressing
Gender Bias: A View from the Eighth Circuit Federal Court System, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 205
(2002) (studying gender bias in the federal court system).
2. Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts:
Change and Continuity Across 20 Years, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 47, 65 (2008).
3. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61 (1967) (reasoning
that descriptive representation "depends on the representative's characteristics, on what he is or
is like, on being something rather than doing something").
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suggests that judicial institutions are accessible to women seeking to
hold office4 and "reflects a degree of openness in the political process."5
More broadly, the presence of a judiciary that reflects the composition
of the population potentially aids in conferring legitimacy on court
decisions and authority. As Professor Linda Maule states: "A court
system that does not reflect the membership of society breeds
increasingly higher levels of disaffection and disillusionment. Thus, as
more women are placed on the bench, the democratic regime is
strengthened."6
Beyond descriptive representation, scholars and judges explain
that women can provide a unique perspective, or "different voice,"
traditionally missing from state and federal judiciaries.7 Specifically,
Professor Carol Gilligan suggests that differences in the way in which
men and women conceptualize morality and navigate moral
predicaments/dilemmas are seen as early as childhood, with women
more likely to express an "ethic of care" reflecting values such as
empathy, communication, and "connectedness."8 Building from
Professor Gilligan's work, scholars have argued that female jurists,
given differences in socialization, background, and experience, "will
employ different legal reasoning, and will seek different results from
the legal process."9 These differences can emerge in the legal reasoning
and rationale used by women on the bench even when observable
differences in the voting behavior of male and female jurists are not
apparent.10
4. Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender
Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 425 (1994).
5. Sally J. Kenney, Infinity Project Seeks to Increase Gender Diversity of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 92 JUDICATURE 131, 132 (2008); see Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow,
The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 597
(1985) (explaining that diverse participation reflects an openness in the political process).
6. Linda S. Maule, A Different Voice: The Feminine Jurisprudence of the Minnesota State
Supreme Court, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 295, 296 (2000).
7. Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 389, 391 (2010); Sue Davis, Do Women Judges Speak '7n a Different Voice?" Carol Gilligan,
Feminist Legal Theory, and the Ninth Circuit, 8 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 144 (1993).
8. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 74 (1982); see also Patricia Yancey Martin et al.,
Gender Bias and Feminist Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory
Analysis, 27 SIGNS 665, 667 (2002) (arguing that men and women have different judicial
"standpoints").
9. See, e.g., Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, State High Courts and Divorce: The Impact of
Judicial Gender, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 926 (2005) (arguing that the presence of female judges
will achieve meaningful sexual equality in American law); see also Kjersten Nelson, Double-Bind
on the Bench: Citizen Perceptions of Judge Gender and the Court, 11 POL. & GENDER 235, 255
(2015) (explaining that female judges enjoy an advantage due to unique perspectives).
10. See Susan L. Miller & Shana L. Maier, Moving Beyond Numbers: What Female Judges
Say About Different Judicial Voices, 29 J. WOMEN POL. & POL'Y 527, 545 (2008) (finding, through
interviews with female judges, that female jurists sometimes approach cases and fact patterns
2017] 1847
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Finally, depending on the content of their jurisprudence, the
inclusion of female judges can also promote the substantive
representation of women's interests" and create a court more
"receptive" to the concerns of women.12 In the legislative arena, this
substantive representation can manifest through emphasis on issues
such as education, childcare, maternity politics, and policies that
promote pay and workplace equality.13 In the courtroom, scholars
consider votes in favor of the "women's position"14 in sex discrimination
cases, family law, and reproductive policies, along with more liberal
votes in general, as indicative of some degree of substantive
representation in the judicial arena.15
Even though "perception of gender bias in a judge is more
harmful to the legal system than its appearance in other participants,"1 6
we currently know very little regarding whether, or how, gender
diversity of judges and judicial panels affects public opinion in the
aftermath of state court rulings.17 Did this recognition by gender bias
task forces mediate potential public perceptions of judicial decisions?
Does the presence of more women on the bench provide court outcomes
with greater legitimacy among the public as scholars suggest, or, given
that women are generally considered "nontraditional" judges,18 is the
public more likely to view the decisions of state female judges with
greater uncertainty or scrutiny? In this Article, we examine how state
judge gender affects the public's support of judicial outcomes and
perceptions of judicial bias. Specifically, we explore whether
from distinct perspectives; however, the judges she interviewed also explained that judge gender
should not dictate case outcomes); see also Brian McNeill, More Women Judges Needed, Gertner
and Lithwick Say, U. VA. SCH. L. NEWS & MEDIA (Oct. 27, 2011),
https://content.law.virginia.edulnews/2011_falllwomen-inthe-judiciary.htm [https://perma.cc/
2U6G-G4QL] (statement of U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Gertner) ("I can tell you that what's
plausible to me may be very different from what' s plausible to my male colleague.... The law, in
fact, invites us to consider and make judgments about life experiences." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
11. Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the U.S.
Justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 587, 627 (2011) (explaining that judicial diversity
ensures that minorities' interests are considered in the decisionmaking process).
12. Walker & Barrow, supra note 5, at 598.
13. See Sue Thomas, The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies, 53 J. POL. 958, 961
(1991) (highlighting that women will, more often than men, consider issues of women, children,
and family).
14. Donald R. Songer & Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making
in State Supreme Courts, 81 SOc. ScI. Q. 750, 752 (2000).
15. Nelson, supra note 9, at 244.
16. Jackson, supra note 1, at 16.
17. But see Nelson, supra note 9, at 258 (noting that, in certain circumstances, judge gender
matters to citizens as they evaluate court decisions).
18. Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton's Nontraditional Judges: Creating a
More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1994).
1848 [Vol. 70:6:1845
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respondents are more likely to perceive that gender and ideology
influence the decisionmaking of female state judges (when compared to
their male counterparts). Given gender stereotypes that can surround
women in public office, and the act of judging specifically, we argue that
the public is likely to perceive the decisions of male and female judges
differently. This difference in perceptions, however, is conditional on a
variety of factors, including the issue(s) in the case and the gender of
the respondent.
Exploring how judge gender affects public response to state
court decisions is particularly important given that over 90% of
litigation takes place at the state level.19 In addition, given that the
majority of states elect their judges, variation in public response to
court decisions could potentially affect whether judges remain on the
bench and hence overall levels of gender diversity across state
judiciaries.
Our Article proceeds as follows: First, we discuss the current
state of gender diversity in U.S. courts and the existing literature on
gender, judicial behavior, and judge evaluations. Next, we present our
argument and hypotheses regarding public response to state court
decisions contingent on judge gender and case outcomes. The basis of
our argument is twofold. If traditional gender stereotypes continue to
dominate public perceptions of male and female judges, we expect to
find that individuals will be more likely to agree with case outcomes
when a male judge decided the case and to perceive greater reliance on
gender and ideological considerations when a female judge decided the
case. Conversely, if the public eschews traditional views of gender roles
in the judicial context, then we should see individual agreement with
the case outcome, and perceptions of extralegal influences should reflect
respondent preferences independent of judge gender. Using data from
approximately four hundred respondents, we then present the results
of our experiment that varies the gender of state judges in a fictional
child custody case. Overall, we find that the perception of judicial bias
stemming from judge gender is conditional on the gender of the judge
and the gender of the winning litigant. Specifically, respondents are
more likely to state that gender influenced a judge's decision when a
female judge authored a majority opinion awarding custody to the
mother in the dispute. However, respondents also stated that judge
gender influenced a male judge's decision to award custody to the father
in the dispute. We also find evidence that respondents view female
19. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONSTITUTION Soc'y, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO
SITS IN JUDGEMENTS ON STATE COURTS? 3, http://gavelgap.org/pdflgavel-gap-report.pdf (last
visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.ccNJ26-5C3S].
2017] 1849
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judges as more likely to rely on ideology than law, yet this also appears
to be conditional on specific case facts. After discussing the implications
of our results, we also propose additional methods to examine how the
public responds to gender diversity throughout the U.S. judiciary.
I. GENDER DIVERSITY, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, AND JUDGE EVALUATIONS
Within the past thirty years, women have made substantial
gains in terms of representation in federal and state judiciaries.20 The
number of female federal judges increased by over 60% between 1999
and 2009 (from 302 to 496),21 and currently nearly 33% of active Article
III federal judges are women.22 While women have made impressive
gains at the federal level, substantial disparities exist between their
rate of participation on the federal bench and the proportion of women
in the national population (51%). Similar disparities exist in the states
between the proportion of women serving in state judiciaries and their
respective proportions in the states.23 As of December 2014, women
make up approximately 30% of judges serving at the state level, with
percentages varying substantially by state.24 For example, Idaho and
Mississippi exhibit the highest levels of gender disparity between the
proportion of women on the bench and the proportion of women in the
state population. Specifically, both states have approximately 66%
fewer women on the bench than would be predicted based upon the
proportion of women in the state. 25 Of all fifty states, Oregon has the
lowest levels of gender disparity in terms of descriptive representation
(only 12% fewer women on the bench than would be predicted based
upon the proportion of women in the state population).26
20. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 2, at 65.
21. Am. Constitution Soc'y, Male Judges Far Outnumber Women Judges, Federal Court
Graph Shows, ACSLAW: ACSBLOG (Nov. 30, 2010), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/male-judges-
far-outnumber-women-judges-federal-court-graph-shows [https://perma.cc/7Q2V-3N9L]
(reporting the increase in female judges).
22. NAT'L WOMEN's LAW CTR., WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STILL A LONG WAY TO Go
1 (2016), https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/JudgesCourtsWomeninFedJud10.13
.2016.pdf [https://perma.ce/83MT-XFDB].
23. Malia Reddick et al., Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, JUDGES'
J., Summer 2009, at 28, 30.
24. GEORGE & YOON, supra note 19, at 2.
25. See id. at 8 ("We calculate the Gavel Gap by dividing the difference between the
proportion of women and/or minorities on the bench and women and/or minorities in the general
population by the proportion of women and/or minorities in the general population."). For
Mississippi and Idaho, the gavel gap is -0.6568 and -0.6599, respectively. Id. at 21 tbl.A-12.
26. See id. at 22 (stating that for Oregon, the gavel gap is -0.1228); see also Kathleen A.
Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appointment
Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 Soc. Scl. Q. 504, 505 (2002)
(arguing that descriptive representation is desirable because it translates into more effective
1850 [Vol. 70:6:1845
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A. Gender, Judicial Behavior, and State Courts
Given differences in socialization, background, and experience
as compared to their white male counterparts, many scholars suggest
that female judges will exhibit liberal voting behavior and render
decisions more likely to favor the interests of women and minorities.27
Researchers also typically expect to find the most evidence of gender
differences in legal issues where gender is salient, such as employment
discrimination, reproductive rights, and child welfare.28 Although most
studies of gender and judicial decisionmaking focus on federal courts,29
a number of studies find evidence of gender effects in state courts
(though these results are not always in the hypothesized direction).30
Professors Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle search for gender effects in
substantive representation); Greg Goelzhauser, Diversifying State Supreme Courts, 45 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 761, 777 (2011) (noting that descriptive representation enhances perceptions of
institutional legitimacy among minorities); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining
Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State
Supreme and Appellate Courts, 3 ST. POL. & POLY Q. 329, 330 (2003) (explaining that descriptive
representation is a function of a variety of factors that are contingent upon time, level of court,
and type of political minority aspiring to the bench); Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 14, at 760
(discussing the difference in background, education, and legal experience of male and female
judges); Margaret Williams, Women's Representation on State Trial and Appellate Courts, 88 Soc.
SCI. Q. 1192, 1198 (2007) (discussing factors that affect gender and racial diversity in state courts).
27. See Bratton & Spill, supra note 26, at 506 (discussing the differences in judicial behavior
between male and female judges in certain contexts); Davis, supra note 7, at 171 (discussing
theories that suggest sexual differences in decisionmaking); Elaine Martin, Men and Women on
the Bench: Vive la Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204, 208 (1990) (suggesting that female judges may
be more attuned to liberal issues than male judges); Walker & Barrow, supra note 5, at 614 (noting
the public's assumption that women are more sympathetic to liberal policy goals).
28. Songer et al., supra note 4, at 429; see also SUSAN B. HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY
MATTERS: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 47 (2015) (reporting that
women judges are more likely to support plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases); Jennifer A. Segal,
Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's District Court Appointees, 53 POL.
RES. Q. 137, 138 (2000) (suggesting that a judge who is a member of a certain group would exhibit
greater support for that group).
29. Boyd et al., supra note 7; see also Bratton & Spill, supra note 26, at 505; Paul M. Collins,
Jr. et al., Gender, Critical Mass, and Judicial Decision Making, 32 LAW & POL'Y 260 (2010); Todd
Collins & Laura Moyer, Gender, Race, and Intersectionality on the Federal Appellate Bench, 61
POL. RES. Q. 219 (2007); Davis, supra note 7; Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the
U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129 (1993); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional
Dynamics on the U.S. Court ofAppeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004); Haire & Moyer, supra note 28; Susan W. Johnson and Donald R.
Songer, Judge Gender and the Voting Behavior of Justices on Two North American Supreme
Courts, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 265 (2009); Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the
Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, 14 Soc. SCl. J. 77 (1977);
Martin, supra note 27; Laura Moyer, Rethinking Critical Mass in the Federal Appellate Courts, 34
J. WOMEN POL. & POL'Y 49 (2013); Laura P. Moyer & Susan B. Haire, Trailblazers and Those That
Followed: Personal Experiences, Gender, and Judicial Empathy, 49 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 665 (2015);
Segal, supra note 28; Songer et al., supra note 4; Walker & Barrow, supra note 5.
30. David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices:
Are They Tokens or Outsiders?, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 232, 241 (1987).
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cases involving "women's issues" such as divorce and family law. 3 1
Focusing on the Michigan Supreme Court, Martin and Pyle examine
decisionmaking in cases involving divorce litigation, discrimination,
and "feminist issues" (e.g., sexual harassment and reproductive rights).
Martin and Pyle find that male judges vote more liberally in
discrimination cases (male judges voted liberally at a rate of 53.2%
whereas female judges' rate of liberal voting was 38.3%). However, as
expected, Martin and Pyle find that female judges were more likely to
vote in favor of the woman's position in divorce cases (an area of law
where gender is particularly salient). In cases involving discrimination,
party effects appeared to trump the influence of gender in explaining
vote outcomes.32
In a subsequent analysis of divorce cases in thirty-seven states,
Martin and Pyle find additional evidence that female judges are more
likely to vote in favor of the women's position in divorce cases (this
includes disputes surrounding child support, spousal support, and
property division).33 A bivariate analysis reveals that female justices
voted in favor of female litigants approximately 75% of the time
whereas male justices supported female litigants at a rate of 54%.34
Martin and Pyle also find that male justices are more likely to vote in
favor of women in divorce cases when they sit on a state supreme court
with either one or three female justices.35
Similarly, Professor Maule's examination of the Minnesota
Supreme Court (between 1985 and 1994) found that women on the court
were unified in nonunanimous family law cases approximately 90% of
the time, but less unified in criminal cases.36 Interestingly, in her
analysis of opinion language, Maule identifies distinct differences in the
prose used by men and women on the Minnesota court. Maule states:
In each of these cases the majority opinion-authored by men-tended to focus on rules,
processes and regulations. In contrast, the dissenting opinions focused either on the
responsibility of a husband to a wife even after the marriage had been dissolved or on an
obligation of a father to abide by the original intent of a child support contract even after
his wife's circumstances had changed.
3 7
31. Martin & Pyle, supra note 9; see also Maule, supra note 6, at 301 (discussing studies that
have examined the voting behavior of female judges on "women's issues").
32. Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the Michigan Supreme
Court, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1205, 1225 (2000).
33. Martin & Pyle, supra note 9, at 936.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 938.
36. Maule, supra note 6, at 307.
37. Id. at 313.
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Maule explains that this finding supports the existence of a "different
voice" in that male and female judges seemingly address family law
disputes using distinct moral frameworks.
In her work, Gender, Judicial Dissent, and Issue Salience,
Professor Madhavi McCall argues that scholars should also consider the
broader political environment when attempting to uncover gender
effects in judicial outcomes.38 In her examination of state supreme court
decisionmaking in sexual harassment cases (between 1980 and 1998),
she finds that the 1992 Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Senate hearings
served as an important watershed moment.39 Prior to 1992, she shows
that female justices were more likely than men to dissent in sexual
harassment cases and more likely to vote in a liberal (i.e., pro-woman)
direction.40 However, after 1992, with the issue of sexual harassment
much more politically salient, she finds that men and women did not
exhibit a statistically significant difference in their dissenting
behavior.41
While many analyses focus on issues where gender is salient, a
number of scholars examining the state environment examine the
influence of gender on legal questions outside of women's issues. In
their analysis of almost 40,000 cases, Professors John Gruhl, Cassia
Spohn, and Susan Welch find that female metropolitan trial judges
were less likely to find defendants guilty (when compared to their male
counterparts).4 2 Interestingly, female judges were more likely to
sentence those defendants found guilty to prison and to hand down
slightly longer sentences. In addition, male judges sentenced women to
prison at lower rates than female judges.
Professors Madhavi McCall and Michael A. McCall, along with
Professors Donald R. Songer and Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, find evidence
that female state supreme court judges are more likely to vote liberally
in search and seizure cases and death penalty and obscenity cases,
38. See Madhavi McCall, Gender, Judicial Dissent, and Issue Salience: The Voting Behavior
of State Supreme Court Justices in Sexual Harassment Cases, 1980-1998, 40 Soc. SCI. J. 79, 80
(2003) (noting that the salience of a political issue might lead justices to render decisions that are
more consistent with public opinion, regardless of their personal standing with respect to the
matter).
39. Id. at 79.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 308, 314 (1981) (failing to confirm the authors' hypothesis that female judges would be more
lenient than male judges in determining guilt and assigning sentences, as the differences in
convicting and sentencing behavior between male and female judges were not large and not
consistently in the direction that the authors predicted).
2017] 1853
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respectively.4 3 Prior to 1980, McCall and McCall find little evidence of
gender effects in search and seizure cases; however, they surmise that
gender effects may not emerge until the number of women on individual
courts increases (i.e., until a "critical mass" is achieved). Post-1990, as
the number of women on state supreme courts increased, they find that
the probability of a woman voting in favor of a defendant increases by
approximately thirty points (however this probability decreases if the
justice is elected). McCall and McCall's analysis also shows that the
presence of another woman on the court increases the likelihood that a
woman will cast a liberal vote. Similarly, Songer and Crews-Meyer not
only find that women are more likely to vote liberally in death penalty
and obscenity cases, but their results also show that the presence of a
woman on a panel increases the likelihood that a male justice will vote
in a liberal direction as well.4 4 Overall, scholars find consistent evidence
of gender effects in state courts and evidence that women are more
likely to vote liberally across multiple legal areas including those not
traditionally classified as women's issues.
Given the findings of gender influences and differences in the
decisionmaking of male and female judges across the U.S. judiciary, an
important question is whether gender affects how judges are perceived
and evaluated. Although few scholars have directly examined how
judge gender affects the way in which the public responds to court
outcomes, several researchers find that gender affects the way in which
judicial candidates for federal vacancies and state judges are evaluated
by professional, state, and private organizations.45
43. See Madhavi McCall & Michael A. McCall, How Far Does the Gender Gap Extend?
Decision Making on State Supreme Courts in Fourth Amendment Cases, 1980-2000, 44 SOc. Sl.
J. 67, 68 (2007) (adapting social psychology's critical mass theory, suggesting that women are only
able to exert influence after they "constitute approximately 15-25% of an institution's
membership"); Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 14, at 757 (suggesting that "replacing male
judges with women from the same party on a given court would produce substantially greater
probabilities of liberal votes").
44. See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 14, at 757 ('The strong, statistically significant
coefficients for having a woman colleague suggest that judges with at least one female colleague
are substantially more likely than judges with only male colleagues to cast liberal votes in both
areas.").
45. See Rebecca D. Gill et al., Are Judicial Performance Evaluations Fair to Women and
Minorities? A Cautionary Tale from Clark County, Nevada, 45 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 731, 750 (2011)
(noting that with all control variables equal, female judges in Clark County, Nevada, were found
to score 11.27 points lower than their male colleagues on attorney judicial performance surveys);
Susan Brodie Haire, Rating the Ratings of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 8 (2001) (finding that even after controlling for other judicial
qualification indicators, females were more likely to receive lower ABA ratings).
1854 [Vol. 70:6:1845
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B. Gender and Judicial Evaluations
When controlling for differences in experience and legal
training, researchers find that federal and state female judges receive
lower assessment ratings and performance evaluations on average than
their male counterparts.46 Like research on gender and judicial
outcomes, most research on judicial evaluations focuses on federal
judges. Since 1953,47 the White House, in conjunction with the
Department of Justice, routinely forwards its "short list" of potential
nominees for federal court vacancies to the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary to evaluate candidates
on their "integrity, professional competence and judicial
temperament."48 Based on responses to candidate questionnaires and
interviews, the American Bar Association ("ABA") rates potential
nominees as either "well qualified," "qualified," or "not qualified."49
In her analysis of U.S. Court of Appeals judges appointed
between 1977 and 1994, Professor Susan B. Haire finds that women
and minorities were more likely to receive lower ABA ratings, even
when controlling for legal experience.50 Specifically, the probability that
a white male received a "well qualified" rating is approximately 76%,
46. Haire, supra note 45, at 8; see also Rebecca D. Gill, Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance
Evaluations: We Must Do Better Than This, 35 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 282 (2014) (finding that upon
instituting data controls, women scored approximately 12 points lower out of 100 than men and
were "significantly less likely to receive 'more than adequate' ratings"); Maya Sen, How Judicial
Qualification Ratings May Disadvantage Minority and Female Candidates, 2 J.L. & CTS. 33, 44
(2014) [hereinafter Sen, Judicial Qualifications] (noting that being a female is one of three traits
that are consistently linked with lower ABA ratings); Maya Sen, Minority Judicial Candidates
Have Changed: The ABA Ratings Gap Has Not, 98 JUDICATURE 46, 51 (2014) [hereinafter Sen,
Minority Candidates] (finding that female candidates are less likely to receive one of the higher
ABA ratings); Elliot E. Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: A
Contemporary Assessment-Part 1, 66 JUDICATURE 349, 356 (1983) (stating that ABA rankings
were "considerably lower" for women than for white males during the Carter era, likely due to the
fact that women were relatively new to the legal profession and were thus less likely to receive a
"well qualified" experience score); Elliot E. Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary: A Contemporary Assessment-Part 2, 66 JUDICATURE 385, 387 (1983) (finding that
"males were nearly three times more likely than females to receive one of the ABA's two highest
designations"). But see Susan Navarro Smelcer et al., Bias and the Bar: Evaluating the ABA
Ratings of Federal Judicial Nominees, 65 POL. RES. Q. 827, 833 (2012) (finding only modest
statistical evidence of gender differences in ABA ratings).
47. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND How
IT WORKS 1 (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/scfedjud/
federaljudiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSZ5-775H].
48. Id.
49. See Haire, supra note 45, at 3 (noting that the candidate questionnaire asks about a range
of topics, such as employment history, experience, pro bono, and membership in professional
associations, and that the ABA interviews potential judicial nominees and those in a position to
assess the judicial nominee).
50. Id. at 8.
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while the probability that a woman received a "well qualified" rating is
around 60%. Similarly, Professor Maya Sen also finds that women and
African-Americans are more likely to receive lower ratings when
controlling for education and experience.51 Interestingly, although the
background of traditional and nontraditional candidates has become
more similar over time (in terms of education, legal training, and
experience), the ABA ratings gap persists, although to a lesser extent
for female nominees.52
Scholars find that state judicial performance evaluations,
usually rated by attorneys, suffer from similar biases as the ABA
ratings for federal judges.53 State judicial performance evaluations,
which can be administrated by state, professional, or private
organizations, generally serve two purposes. One goal is to "increase the
ability of judges to improve themselves through constructive criticism
and feedback."54 Another goal is to assist voters in making informed
selections in judicial elections, in regard to factors such as judicial
professionalism, legal ability, and impartiality. In their analysis of Las
Vegas Review-Journal's "Judging the Judges" of Nevada judges,
Professors Rebecca D. Gill, Sylvia R. Lazos, and Mallory M. Waters
compare the retention score ratings for Nevada judges.55 The judicial
performance evaluation under examination asks respondents
(attorneys) whether they would recommend retaining the judge in
question (with one hundred being the highest score possible). They find
that male judges routinely receive higher ratings than female judges.
This ratings gap (of 11.27 points in this particular analysis) is present
despite the authors finding no statistically significant gender
differences in reversal rates, background experience, and rate of ethical
complaints.56
Overall, gender influences the U.S. judiciary in multiple ways.
There is persuasive evidence that gender affects judicial behavior and
court outcomes across legal issues and levels of the U.S. judiciary. In
51. Sen, Judicial Qualifications, supra note 46, at 44.
52. See Sen, Minority Candidates, supra note 46, at 50-51 (finding that the data
demonstrated a "movement by minority candidates toward the education and professional path
pursued by white candidates").
53. See Gill et al., supra note 45, at 738 (explaining that female judges perform stereotypically
male work and are at a disadvantage due to their defiance of gender role expectations); Gill, supra
note 46, at 276-77 (examining the unconscious impact of implicit gender and racial bias on judicial
performance evaluations, as social cognition theory indicates that higher rates of bias occur in
hiring decisions with stereotypical job characteristics that conflict with gender and race
stereotypes).
54. Gill et al., supra note 45, at 733.
55. Id. at 733-34. The survey specifically asks about Nevada Supreme Court justices and
lower court judges in Clark County. Id. at 748.
56. Id. at 750.
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addition, female judges and judicial candidates receive lower
performance and assessment ratings. Given these findings, an
important question is whether judge gender has a significant influence
over public perception of court outcomes and decisions. In her research,
Professor Kjersten Nelson discusses the "double-bind" that women face
on the bench. 57 Female judges who conform to masculine expectations
face appearing less empathetic, yet female judges who seem empathic
on the bench risk castigation for behaving in a manner at odds with
stereotypes attached to a "judicial" identity.58 Nelson's experiments,
involving a U.S. Court of Appeals gender-based pay discrimination case,
show that respondents are more likely to find female judges more
empathetic, but less knowledgeable, when the judge authors a
dissenting opinion in favor of expanding the time frame in which
individuals can bring a discrimination claim. Nelson's analysis provides
important insight regarding how the public juxtaposes assessments of
gender, empathy, and judge knowledge. However, many questions
remain regarding public opinion and gender diversity in the judiciary.
Specifically, does the public perceive that female justices are more
likely to rely on extralegal factors, such as ideology, in the course of
their decisionmaking? In addition, how does the inclusion of certain
gender-salient legal issues (e.g., abortion) affect public response to court
outcomes and majority opinions authored by female jurists? Below, we
present our argument regarding gender stereotypes, court outcomes,
and public opinion.
II. GENDER, JUDGING, AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION
Building from existing research on gender stereotypes and Role
Congruity Theory,59 we argue that the public will be more likely to
perceive female judges as relying on extralegal factors in their rulings
than male judges. Female judges, along with judges of color, are often
57. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 238 (noting that citizens "apply gendered assessments to
female judges when those judges take positions that emphasize their identities as 'women' "); see
also Scott S. Boddery et al., Naming Names: The Impact of Supreme Court Opinion Attribution on
Citizen Assessment of Policy Outcomes (July 9, 2016) (unpublished article),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2807349 [https://perma.cc/74BD-4YQR] (exploring whether the gender
attributed to the majority opinion writers of U.S. Supreme Court opinions affects public support
for case outcomes).
58. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 238 (finding that both the sex of judges and the "traits and
knowledge attributed to them" have an impact on citizen support for their court decisions).
59. See Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female
Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 575 (2002) (noting that in addition to the congruity, or
incongruity, between gender roles and leadership roles, Role Congruity Theory also explores




referred to as nontraditional judges.60 This characterization as
nontraditional judges represents a layered identity and concept. At the
descriptive level, women are classified as nontraditional because the
occupants of judicial offices were traditionally white males. Second,
differences in background, education, and legal experience also mark
women as nontraditional, when compared to the background of white
male judges. While these experiential differences have become less
pronounced over time, some important differences remain as female
judges generally have less prosecutorial experience, less private
practice experience, and more experience in academia.61 Finally,
women's gender identity and experience can produce a perspective and
a legal jurisprudence distinct from that of white male judges. Several
commentators argue that female judges bring a unique perspective to
the bench. For example, Professor Mary L. Clark observes, "women as
women, bring something different to the bench, shaping judicial
outcomes in different ways."6 2 Similarly, regarding female judges,
Vanderbilt Law Professor Suzanna Sherry explains, "women's
experiences as women give them greater empathy and insight into
women's problems."63 The distinct perspective that women can bring to
the bench is one key reason (among many) for the call to increase
descriptive representation in the judiciary. However, we argue that the
"different voice" which is sometimes ascribed to female jurists,
combined with other aspects of their gender-based identity as a
nontraditional judge, can potentially affect the way in which the public
responds to the decisions of female judges.
Despite significant progress, gender-based stereotypes
regarding personality traits and leadership roles are still present. This
is especially pronounced in public perceptions of political candidates
60. See Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 2, at 47 (examining methods of judicial selection in
state and federal appellate courts and finding no relationship between the use of different selection
systems and rates of judicial diversity).
61. See Haire, supra note 45, at 7-8 (finding that judicial appointees with more bar
experience before their appointments were more likely to have a higher ABA rating); Sen, Minority
Candidates, supra note 46, at 50-51 (noting that, since the Clinton era, the prior experience of
minority and female nominees has become increasingly similar to that of the average white
candidate).
62. Mary L. Clark, One Man's Token is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The Appointment of
the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REV. 487, 541 (2004).
63. Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 LAW & INEQ. 159, 160 (1986).
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and officials, 64  policy knowledge/expertise,65  and ideology.66
Additionally, "agentic" attributes are often assigned to men, whereas
"communal" attributes are assigned to women. Agentic characteristics
include "leader," "assertive," "confident," and "dominant."67 Communal
attributes consist of features such as "helpful," "sympathetic,"
"sensitive," and in general "a concern with the welfare of other people."6 8
Scholars have also linked some of these communal attributes to a
"feminine" jurisprudence.69
In their discussion of Role Congruity Theory, Professors Alice H.
Eagly and Steven J. Karau explain, "[t]he potential for prejudice
against female leaders that is inherent in the female gender role follows
64. Male officials are often associated with traits such as strength, assertiveness,
intelligence, and leadership, whereas women are often seen as consensus-builders and as warm,
honest, and trustworthy. See, e.g., BARBARA C. BURRELL, A WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN THE HOUSE:
CAMPAIGNING FOR CONGRESS IN THE FEMNIST ERA 15 (1994) (noting that female candidates for
political leadership have to overcome gender stereotypes which are seen as antithetical to the
masculine leadership traits needed to hold public office); Kathleen Dolan & Kira Sanbonmatsu,
Gender Stereotypes and Attitudes Toward Gender Balance in Government, 37 AM. POL. RES. 409,
420 (2009) (finding that gender stereotypes are related to representation preferences, as there are
general beliefs about the categories of "men politicians" and "women politicians"); Leonie Huddy
& Nayda Terkildsen, Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates, 37
AM. J. POL. SCI. 119, 119 (1993) (finding that masculine traits increased a candidate's "perceived
competence of a broader range of issues than .. . feminine traits"); Jennifer L. Lawless, Women,
War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era, 57 POL. RES. Q.
479, 480 (2004) (explaining that citizens are more likely to see men as being "assertive, active, and
self-confident," and women as "compassionate, willing to compromise, and 'people-oriented' ").
65. The public views male officials as more competent with issues such as crime, terrorism,
and foreign affairs, whereas women tend to be given an advantage in issue competence in regard
to education, healthcare, family, and reproductive politics. See, e.g., KIM FRIDKIN KAHN, THE
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF BEING A WOMAN 10-11 (1996) (noting that voter stereotypes about
candidates influence the issues that candidates focus on in their campaigns, leading women to
concentrate on education and health policy and men to focus on the economy and defense);
Kathleen Dolan, The Impact of Gender Stereotyped Evaluations on Support for Women Candidates,
32 POL. BEHAV. 69, 77 (2010) (determining that a majority of survey respondents believed that
women are better able to handle education and health care issues and that men are more equipped
to respond to terrorism issues, but noting that 38-40% of respondents did not find a difference
between the abilities of each gender to handle these issues).
66. The public also tends to view women candidates and officials as more liberal. See, e.g.,
Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits,
46 POL. RES. Q. 527, 536 (1993) (noting that voters believe female candidates to be more
"compassionate, moral, hardworking, and liberal" than men by "large margins"); Jeffrey W. Koch,
Candidate Gender and Assessments of Senate Candidates, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 84, 86-87 (1999) (noting
that of nineteen female Senate challengers from 1988 through 1992, thirteen were Democrats and
six were Republicans); Monika L. McDermott, Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information
Elections, 51 POL. RES. Q. 895, 897 (1998) (finding that liberal voters are more likely to favor female
candidates due to the stereotype that women are more liberal than their "male counterparts").
67. Eagly & Karau, supra note 59, at 574.
68. Id.
69. See Maule, supra note 6, at 297 (noting several names and forms which have been
recognized as belonging to "feminine" jurisprudence); Miller & Maier, supra note 10, at 550
(recognizing that male and female judges often reach similar legal conclusions but follow different
"gender-related" paths to do so).
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from its dissimilarity to the expectations that people typically have
about leaders."70 Role Congruity Theory identifies two consequences of
the perceived disjunction between gender roles and leadership roles.
One consequence is that women who could potentially occupy
leadership roles will be viewed less favorably than potential male
leadership role candidates will. The second consequence, and the one
most pertinent for this analysis, is that evaluation of women's
performance in certain leadership roles can suffer when compared to
the evaluation of men in leadership roles.71 In regard to the judiciary,
experimental research confirms that men and women are more likely to
implicitly associate "male" with judge and "female" with paralegal
occupations.72 The perception of role incongruity can also affect women
in legislative and executive offices;73 however, an important distinction
is that the norms (or "myths") that surround judicial institutions and
behavior include impartiality, neutrality, and a nonpolitical decision
process (as compared to other political offices and positions).74 If judicial
70. Eagly & Karau, supra note 59, at 575.
71. Id.
72. See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession:
An Empirical Study, 18 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 28 (2010) (examining the methodology and
underlying results of a study on the implicit gender bias present in law students).
73. Although some of the gender-trait stereotypes seem counter to the characteristics
assigned to leadership positions, and women seek office at lower rates than men, those women who
do run for office generally perform at rates comparable to their male counterparts. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Fox & Jennifer L. Lawless, To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political
Ambition, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 642, 655 (2005) (noting that women are substantially less likely to
express political ambition or interest in holding high-level political office); Brian Frederick &
Matthew J. Streb, Women Running for Judge: The Impact of Sex on Candidate Success in State
Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 89 Soc. Sci. Q. 937, 950 (2008) (stating that candidate sex
does not appear to impede women, through either merit selection or judicial election processes,
from being appointed to a state bench); Jennifer L. Lawless & Kathryn Pearson, The Primary
Reason for Women's Underrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom, 70 J. POL. 67,
77-78 (2008) (concluding that while women tend to fare as well as men in congressional primaries,
men continue to comprise the significant majority of candidates overall). In addition, perception of
women as more empathetic and trustworthy can be advantageous when anti-incumbent sentiment
is high or when issues of corruption are politically salient. See, e.g., Tiffany D. Barnes & Emily
Beaulieu, Gender Stereotypes and Corruption: How Candidates Affect Perceptions of Election
Fraud, 10 POL. & GENDER 365, 384 (2014) (finding that the presence of women in high political
offices reduces public concerns about corruption and election fraud); Michael X. Delli Carpini &
Ester R. Fuchs, The Year of the Woman? Candidates, Voters, and the 1992 Elections, 108 POL. Sl.
Q. 29, 34 (1993) (stating that women are traditionally recognized as political outsiders, and are
thus well-situated to challenge incumbents viewed as corrupt); see also Maule, supra note 6, at 297
(discussing how female legislators tend to raise different issues than their male counterparts);
Miller & Maier, supra note 10.
74. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Confirmation Politics and the Legitimacy of
the U.S. Supreme Court: Institutional Loyalty, Positivity Bias, and the Alito Nomination, 53 AM.
J. POL. SC. 139, 142 (2009) (noting how the "myth of legality" explains why those most familiar
with the courts are the least likely to recognize bias within the institution).
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offices are associated with a male gender identity,75 the public could
view female judges as more likely to deviate from these expected norms
through a greater reliance on extralegal factors such as personal gender
identity and ideology. Realistically, the public does not expect judges to
completely disengage from outside influences and make judicial
decisions in a vacuum (i.e., "mechanical jurisprudence").76 In fact, the
public is well aware that factors such as ideology influence judicial
behavior, and scholars find that public recognition of the influence of
extralegal factors does not necessarily damage levels of diffuse support
for, or belief in, the legitimacy of judicial institutions.77 However, there
is also evidence that the public expresses less support for the use of
personal ideology considerations in judicial decisionmaking in
comparison to legalistic factors.78 Given that female judges are framed
as the "other"79 in relation to judicial reasoning and jurisprudence and
possess an identity as nontraditional judges, they may be particularly
vulnerable to public perceptions of ideologically driven decisionmaking
or the perception that their decisions are influenced by other extralegal
influences. This is not to suggest that male judges' ideology and gender
identity do not influence their decisionmaking. In fact, in The Impact of
Maleness on Judicial Decision Making: Masculinity, Chivalry, and
Immigration Appeals, Professors Rebecca Gill, Michael Kagan, and
Fatma Marouf find that male-centered frames such as chivalry and
masculinity significantly influence the voting behavior of male judges.80
In addition, a Florida state task force on gender bias in the courtroom
found that all-male panels were more likely to vote in favor of the father
in custody cases.81 However, because judicial positions and behaviors
75. See Levinson & Young, supra note 72, at 28 (stating that law students implicitly associate
"judge" with "male").
76. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy
of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAw & Soc'YREV. 195, 206 (2011) (examining American perceptions
of Supreme Court decisionmaking in relation to extralegal factors and their impact on impartial
judicial decisionmaking).
77. Id.
78. See Michael J. Nelson & Steven S. Smith, Public Attitudes About Supreme Court
Decision-Making: Sources of Instability in Beliefs About Legal Realism 17 (unpublished
manuscript) (available online) (noting that, based on a 2011 survey by The American Panel Survey,
Americans are less inclined to support an "ideological court').
79. See Rebecca D. Gill et al., The Impact of Maleness on Judicial Decision Making:
Masculinity, Chivalry, and Immigration Appeals, 6 POL. GROUPS & IDENTITIES (forthcoming 2018)
(noting how male behavior is typically used as a baseline from which the assessment of female
judges is measured).
80. Id.
81. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 17-18 (finding that state appellate courts have overturned
a number of lower court cases because of biased behavior/statements from male judges and
attorneys toward female witnesses and attorneys, and concluding with concern that the gender
bias exhibited threatened the impartiality ofjudicial proceedings).
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are stereotyped82 and normalized83 as male, we argue that the public is
less likely to perceive male judges as influenced by their personal
ideology or gender. In other words, "masculinity often remains invisible
and unmarked."84 We develop three key hypotheses in order to
empirically examine our argument regarding public response to state
judge gender and judicial decisionmaking.
Hi: Respondents are more likely to agree with a decision/majority
opinion from a male judge (as compared to a female judge).
H2: Respondents are more likely to find that gender influences the
decision/majority opinion of a female judge (as compared to a
male judge).
H3: Respondents are more likely to find that ideology influences
the decision/majority opinion of a female judge (as compared to a
male judge).
III. GENDER AND PUBLIC OPINION
Gender repeatedly emerges as an explanatory factor in U.S.
public opinion across a range of issues.85 With issues of crime and
punishment, women are more likely to express increased support for
gun control and reduced support for the death penalty.86 In regard to
"compassion issues," women express more support for programs to
benefit the poor and elderly and increased support for educational
spending.87 Women are also more supportive of employment protections
82. See Clark, supra note 62, at 546 (stating that the presence of women in the judiciary
challenges commonly held gender stereotypes).
83. See Gill et al., supra note 79 (stating that theories of judicial decisionmaking generally
"normalize" male behavior); Levinson & Young, supra note 72, at 28 (noting that in a legal setting,
"male," rather than "female," is more strongly associated with "judge" among law students).
84. Gill et al., supra note 79.
85. See Carpini & Fuchs, supra note 73, at 30-32 (discussing how historical factors and
modern social perceptions affect women seeking political office); Eagly & Karau, supra note 59, at
575 (examining how gender role expectations for women differ from those expectations people
typically have for leadership positions); Haire & Moyer, supra note 28, at 30 (exploring how judicial
decisionmaking approaches differ between men and women on the appellate bench); Walker &
Barrow, supra note 5, at 599 (exploring the role of gender in relation to the policymaking behavior
of judges); see also BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS
OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES (2010) (analyzing how gender may obscure data
on collective public opinion); Robert Y. Shapiro & Harpreet Mahajan, Gender Differences in Policy
Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 42, 43 (1986)
(examining how the "gender gap" has affected political attitudes and voting preferences over a
twenty-year period).
86. See Shapiro & Mahajan, supra note 85, at 50 (detailing the different responses to policy-
direction polls by men and women); Walker & Barrow, supra note 5, at 599 (examining gender
differences in attitudes toward gun control and the death penalty).
87. Shapiro & Mahajan, supra note 85, at 45.
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and adoption rights for same-sex couples."8 In addition, Professor
Kathleen Dolan finds that female respondents are more likely to
indicate a willingness to vote for female candidates.89 We also expect
that public opinion toward state judge decisionmaking will vary
according to respondent gender. Overall, we expect that female
respondents should be more supportive of decisions that favor the
female litigant (i.e., pro-woman position), and male respondents more
supportive of decisions favoring the male litigant.90 Additionally, it is
likely that respondents will be more apt to attribute extralegal
influences to judicial decisionmaking processes when the decision
results in an outcome with which the respondent disagrees.91 Therefore,
if respondents are less likely to support decisions that favor the opposite
gender (H4), respondents should also be more likely to find that gender
and ideology influenced the case outcome in those instances (H5 and
H6).
H4: Male (female) respondents will be more likely to agree with
the outcome favoring the male (female) litigant.
H5: Male (female) respondents will be more likely to perceive the
judge as being influenced by gender when the outcome favors the
female (male) litigant.
H6: Male (female respondents will be more likely to perceive the
judge as being inuenced by ideology when the outcome favors the
female (male) litigant.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
To test our hypotheses, we developed and fielded a survey
experiment to examine whether the gender of judges affects public
perceptions of their decisions on a number of dimensions. The
treatment in our experiment is introduced through a vignette mirroring
a news article summarizing a fictitious state high court decision
reversing the child custody decision of a family court judge. While
hypothetical, the case in our vignette is based on the 2011 decision of
88. Gregory M. Herek, Gender Gaps in Public Opinion About Lesbians and Gay Men, 66 PUB.
OPINION Q. 40, 58 (2002).
89. Kathleen Dolan, Gender Differences in Support for Women Candidates: Is There a Glass
Ceiling in American Politics?, 17 WOMEN & POL. 27, 35 (1997) [hereinafter Dolan, Gender
Differences]; Kathleen Dolan, Voting for Women in the "Year of the Woman," 42 AM. J. POL. SC.
272, 273 (1998).
90. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 21 (summarizing the findings of a Florida task force that
concluded that all-male appellate panels ruled for the father more often in child custody cases).
91. Alex Badas, The Public's Motivated Response to Supreme Court Decision-Making, 37
JUST. SYs. J. 318, 325 (2016); Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision
Making, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 709, 719-20 (2011).
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the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Purser v. Owens.92 In Purser, a
family court judge granted custody of a child to the father because the
thirty-five-year-old mother had an abortion after becoming pregnant
during a relationship with a nineteen-year-old. In reversing that
decision, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the family court
erred in considering the abortion as a matter of law based on South
Carolina Supreme Court precedent93 that held a parent's moral conduct
was only relevant in custody cases when it directly impacted the child's
welfare, and the abortion "had no direct or indirect effect on [the child]
and therefore was not relevant to the custody determination."94
Our vignette differed from the original decision in four ways. The
first change was to present the appellate decision as being from the
Supreme Court of South Carolina instead of the South Carolina Court
of Appeals. This was simply to minimize the required knowledge of the
respondents regarding appellate process, since many individuals may
not be aware that many states have an intermediate appellate court,
but most will recognize that the highest court in most states is called
the supreme court. The next two changes were to directly facilitate our
examination of the impact of judge gender on perceptions of judicial
decisionmaking. We randomly varied the gender of the family court
judge and the supreme court justice who authored the majority opinion,
signaling judge gender by using male and female names. Specifically,
respondents receiving a female family court judge treatment were told
the judge's name was Mary Williams, while those receiving a male
family court judge treatment were told the judge's name was John
Williams. Similarly, respondents receiving a female appellate court
judge treatment were told the justice's name was Lisa Smith, while
those receiving a male appellate court judge treatment were told the
justice's name was David Smith.
The final change was to allow us to examine whether any
gender-based perceptions of judicial decisionmaking were conditional
on a case involving what is traditionally viewed as a "women's issue."
To do this we randomly assigned a version of our vignette to some
respondents that identified the issue upon which the original custody
decision was based-and upon which the supreme court reversed-as
the fact that the mother had an abortion (with no mention of the fact
that the abortion was for a pregnancy resulting from a relationship with
a nineteen-year-old) [hereinafter "the abortion treatment"]. The other
respondents received a version of the vignette that identified the
92. 722 S.E.2d 225 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).
93. See Davenport v. Davenport, 220 S.E.2d 228, 231 (S.C. 1975).
94. Purser, 722 S.E.2d at 228.
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relationship with the nineteen-year-old as the key custody issue
(without referencing the abortion) [hereinafter "the boyfriend
treatment"]. A 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design was used to create eight otal
versions of our vignette.95
After the respondents read the vignette, they were given a series
of questions about the case outcome and the judges. The first set focused
on whether the respondent agreed with the custody decision of the
family court judge, the decision of the family court judge to consider the
abortion/boyfriend, and the decision of the supreme court justice to
overturn the family court judge's decision. Responses were given on a
five-point Likert scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly
disagree.'
The second set of questions directly focused on perceptions of
gender bias in judicial decisionmaking. First, respondents were asked
whether they agreed that the gender of Judge Mary/John Williams
influenced her/his custody decision. Then, respondents were asked a
nearly identical question about their perceptions of gender influences in
the decision of Justice Lisa/David Smith. For both questions, responses
were again given on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 'strongly
agree' to'strongly disagree.'
The third and fourth sets of questions were designed to look for
more subtle hints of gender bias in individual perceptions of judicial
decisionmaking. First, respondents were asked about whether they
thought the decision of each judge was based more on legal factors or
more on ideological factors. Responses to these items were on a five-
point scale ranging from 'based solely on personal ideology' to 'based
solely on the law.' Finally, respondents were asked how knowledgeable
they felt each of the judges were about the law in general. Here,
responses were given on a five-point scale ranging from 'extremely
knowledgeable'to'not knowledgeable at all.'
In addition to these survey items, we also included a series of
demographic questions to allow for cross-group comparisons with respect
to respondent gender, religion, and political party affiliation. The final
question on the survey asked respondents to recall who was granted
custody by the family court in the vignette. This question was designed
to ensure that respondents actually read the vignette and did not
simply respond to the other items at random or based on a
misunderstanding of the case.





The survey was conducted between September and November
2016 with undergraduate students enrolled in introductory political
science courses at Georgia State University. A total of 484 students took
the survey, but fifty-eight were dropped due to nonresponse on most of
the survey items. Additionally, while most respondents (79.34%)
correctly answered the recall question about the party granted custody,
respondents providing incorrect answers to this item were also dropped
prior to conducting any analyses of the data. This yielded a total of 338
valid responses.
A. Judge Gender and Perception of Judge Decisionmaking
Examining the data from our survey results, we see that the
gender of the judge appears to have little impact on respondent
agreement with the custody decision at the trial or appellate level, in
contrast to our first hypothesis. As Figure 1 shows, while there is
significantly more agreement with the appellate judge's custody
decision than the trial judge's, there appears to be little difference in
the level of agreement at either the trial or appellate court level based
solely on the gender of the judge. This is reinforced by examining the
difference in mean responses, which is extremely small and not
statistically significant (0.070, p = 0.288 for the trial judge and 0.041, p
= 0.365 for the appellate judge). Moreover, this holds when the data is
subset to look specifically at differences in respondent agreement with
a male versus a female appellate judge when they are reviewing a male
or female trial judge, as the difference in mean responses remains very
small and again fails to achieve statistical significance (0.024, p = 0.226
male trial judge and 0.110, p = 0.261 female trial judge).
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FIGURE 1: AGREEMENT WITH CUSTODY DECISION
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Some interesting differences among respondent perceptions did
emerge in the data based solely on whether respondents received a
treatment with a female judge or a male judge, providing mixed support
for our second and third hypotheses. Most significantly, respondents
were more likely to think that gender influenced the decisionmaking of
the male trial judge than the female trial judge, as illustrated in Figure
2a. The visual differences are especially noticeable in the greater
percentage of 'agree' responses among those receiving the male judge
treatment and 'strongly disagree' responses among those receiving the
female judge treatment. On average, these visual differences equate to a
0.405 (p = 0.001) difference in mean responses based on the gender of
the trial judge. Conversely, as Figure 2b shows, respondents were
significantly more likely to think that gender influenced the female
appellate judge than the male appellate judge. Almost perfectly
mirroring the difference in the trial judge graphs, respondents receiving
the female judge treatment responded with'agree' about ten percentage
points more frequently than those receiving the male judge treatment,
while responding with 'strongly disagree' at a rate of nearly ten
percentage points less. Unsurprisingly then, there is a nearly identical
difference between mean responses (0.402, p = 0.001). This difference
was even greater when looking only at respondents who received the
abortion treatment (0.537, p = 0.001 trial judge and 0.609, p = 0.000
appellate judge), but the difference was tiny and not statistically
significant looking at the boyfriend treatment only.9 6 This shows that,
as expected, perceptions of gender influences in judicial decisionmaking
96. Discussion of results for the abortion treatment only or the boyfriend treatment only




are stronger when dealing with women's issues even if they are not the
primary focus of the case. Additional gender dynamics may also be at
play here, as there is a slightly larger difference (compared to the
baseline above) in respondent perceptions that the female appellate
judge was more influenced by gender when only looking at respondents
whose treatments involved the review of a male trial judge (0.488, p =
0.002) and slightly smaller difference (again compared to the baseline)
when looking solely at treatments involving review of a female judge
(0.301,p = 0.041).
FIGURE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER INFLUENCES ON DECISION
In addition to perceptions of gender influences on
decisionmaking, small differences show up with respect to perceptions
of the influence of law and ideology on judicial decisionmaking.
Curiously, while the influence of ideology on judicial decisionmaking is
thought to be strongest at higher levels of the judicial hierarchy,"9 here
respondents only perceive significant differences between male and
female judges at the trial level .98 Moreover, even these differences are
relatively small and statistically significant at only marginal levels.
Substantively, average responses indicate that respondents view the
female trial judge as slightly more likely to rely on ideology than the male
judge (0.131, p = 0.074). When subset by issue, this result holds (and
becomes slightly larger) when looking only at respondents receiving the
97. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 433 (2002) ('"I'he fact remains that the ideology of the [J~ustices
drives their decisions.").
98. Respondents' average response when asked about the influence of law and ideology was
over a full point more toward the ideology side of the scale for the trial judge than the appellate
judge (p = 0.000).
1868 [Vol. 70:6:1845
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER BL4S
boyfriend treatment (0.183, p = 0.068), but it disappears when looking
only at the abortion treatment.99
B. Influence of Respondent Gender on Perceptions
While the overall differences in perceptions are interesting,
looking at the influence of respondent demographic differences on their
perceptions reveal finer grained insights into the factors influencing
individual perceptions of bias in judicial decisionmaking. Figure 3 shows
the influence of respondent gender on agreement with the custody
decision at both the trial and appellate levels. At the trial level (Figure
3a), the graph for male respondents is strongly skewed to the agree side
of the scale, reflecting an average agreement with the trial court judge's
custody decision that is over half a point higher than female
respondents (0.668, p = 0.000). Additionally, these differences are quite
similar when looking at the abortion treatment only (0.609, p = 0.003)
and boyfriend treatment only (0.559, p = 0.001). Turning to Figure 3b,
we see the opposite at the appellate level. Here it is female respondents
whose responses are skewed to the left with over 30% providing a
'strongly agree' response and over 60% total falling into one of the two
agreement categories. This equates to an average agreement of over
half a point more than male respondents (0.572, p = 0.000), and this is
again true when looking separately at the abortion treatment only
(0.488, p = 0.015) and the boyfriend treatment only (0.549, p = 0.002).
All else equal, it appears quite clear that respondent gender highly
influenced overall agreement with the custody decision in line with our
fourth hypothesis. Male respondents consistently agreed more with
custody decisions favoring the father and female respondents
consistently agreed more with custody decisions favoring the mother
regardless of the gender of the judge.
99. In Appendix II, we explore differences in responses to additional measures of the case
outcome (agreement with the trial judge's decision to consider the abortion/boyfriend) and
perceptions of the judges (knowledge of the law). We also explore the impact of additional
characteristics of respondents on their perceptions (religion and political party identification).
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FIGURE 3: MALE VERSUS FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN AGREEMENT WITH
CUSTODY DECISION
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Moreover, these differences are further magnified when looking
only at those respondents who received the male trial judge treatment.
Here, male respondents are nearly a full point more likely to agree with
the custody decision (0.954, p = 0.000), and this difference balloons to
over a full point when looking only at the abortion treatment (1.154, p
= 0.000). For the boyfriend treatment only, the difference is smaller, but
still quite high at 0.649 (p = 0.002). The differences are less pronounced
between male and female respondents when looking at differences in
agreement with the female trial judge's custody decision. Males still
give higher average levels of agreement overall (0.345, p = 0.059) and
when looking at the boyfriend treatment only (0.461, p = 0.054), but the
differences are noticeably smaller and virtually disappear when looking
only at the abortion treatment (0.050, p = 0.436).
The same relationship between respondent gender and judge
gender holds for perceptions of the appellate judge's custody decision.
Mirroring the results above, the difference between female and male
respondent agreement increases over the baseline when looking only at
the male appellate judge (0.616, p = 0.001), but is slightly attenuated
when looking at only the female appellate judge (0.519, p = 0.009).
When broken down to the two issues, gender differences among
respondent perceptions of the male and female appellate judges'
custody decisions are again similar to those at the trial court level.
When looking only at the abortion issue, female respondents are again
significantly more likely to agree with the custody decision of both the
male appellate judge (0.436, p = 0.050) and the female appellate judge
(0.481, p = 0.100). Additionally, female respondents are more likely to
agree with the decision of both the male appellate judge (0.718, p =
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0.006) and the female appellate judge (0.398, p = 0.058) when looking
only at the boyfriend treatment.
As respondent differences in agreement with the custody
decision make clear, gender (of both the respondent and the judge)
matters. But does this conditional effect influence perceptions of
extralegal influences on judicial decisionmaking? When respondent
perceptions of the influence of gender on the decisionmaking of the
judges were broken down by respondent gender, differences between
male and female respondents appear. As Figure 4 shows, these
differences do not diverge substantively from the baseline finding and
are partially consistent with our fifth hypothesis. Both male and female
respondents continue to view the male trial judge as more influenced
by his gender than the female trial judge; however, this is magnified
when only looking at the responses of males. Figure 4a shows a much
larger skew to the left for male respondents receiving the male trial
judge treatment than for female respondents receiving the same
treatment, driven largely by the fact that males provided an 'agree'
response nearly 30% of the time compared to only about 15% for female
respondents. This difference is reflected in a significantly higher
difference in mean agreement hat the male trial judge was influenced
by gender for only male respondents (0.514, p = 0.020) compared with
only female respondents (0.386, p = 0.004). With respect to perceptions
of gender influences on the decision of the appellate court judge, the
converse holds as shown in Figure 4b. While both male and female
respondents view the female judge as more influenced by her gender as
in the baseline, surprisingly, it is the female respondents who perceived
a much larger difference between the female and male judge (0.480, p =
0.000). For male respondents, there is a more negligible and
statistically insignificant difference (0.174, p = 0.254).
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FIGURE 4: MALE VERSUS FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTIONS OF
GENDER INFLUENCES ON DECISION
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When subset by issue, these differences are virtually identical,
with a few noteworthy exceptions. First, at the trial court level it
appears that both male and female respondent perceptions of a large
difference between the influence of gender on the male versus the
female judge is being driven by the abortion treatment, as the difference
is much lower and fails to achieve statistical significance when looking
only at the boyfriend treatment (0.444, p = 0.111 for males and 0.225, p
= 0.140 for females) than when looking only at the abortion treatment
(0.592, p = 0.039 for males and 0.535, p = 0.003 for females). Second,
while male respondents perceived a small, statistically insignificant
difference in the impact of gender on male versus female appellate
judges overall, when abortion cases are isolated, male respondent views
mirror those of female respondents in finding the female judge to be
more influenced by gender than her male counterpart, with a mean
difference of nearly half a point (0.514, p = 0.091). Third, even when
subset by issue, female respondents consistently respond with higher
levels of agreement when asked whether the female appellate judge was
influenced by gender than when asked about the male judge. Yet, the
magnitude of this difference strongly varies based on the issue
treatment, with the difference being much larger for the abortion
treatment (0.012, p = 0.407) than the boyfriend treatment (0.305, p =
0.066).
The most notable differences in perceptions of extralegal
influences on judicial decisionmaking between male and female
respondents relates to the influence of personal ideology on the trial
judge's decisionmaking. In the full sample, we observed a slight
difference in mean perceptions of the influence of ideology. When
looking separately at male and female respondents, we see that this
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small effect was driven almost entirely by the views of male
respondents. While there are no differences in female respondents
between the male and female trial judges with respect to their reliance
on ideology (0.023, p = 0.000), for male respondents the difference in
mean responses is nearly half a point greater (i.e., more reliant on
personal ideology than legal factors) for the female trial judge (0.489, p
= 0.009). When broken down by issue treatment, the mean difference in
female respondents' perceptions of the use of ideological influences by
the male and female trial judges remains statistically indistinguishable
from zero (0.009, p = 0.524 abortion and 0.056, p = 0.340 boyfriend).
Large differences, however, remain across both treatments for males
(0.433, p = 0.093 abortion and 0.528, p = 0.026 boyfriend). As with the
full sample, when broken down by respondent gender, there remains no
significant difference in perceptions of ideological influences for the
appellate judge.
CONCLUSION
The results of our survey experiment provide us with some
cautious optimism regarding gender stereotypes and their influence (or
lack thereof) on public assessment of judicial decisionmaking. Our first
set of hypotheses (H1-H3) predicted that respondents would express
greater levels of overall agreement with the decisions of a male judge,
and that they would be more likely to attribute extralegal influences to
the decision of a female judge. The data provided minimal support for
this, as respondent agreement with the decisions was no different when
a male judge decided the case versus a female one. Moreover, while
respondents were more likely to agree that a female judge's decision
was influenced by extralegal factors in some situations, in others they
were more likely to agree that a male judge's decision was similarly
influenced. This offers some evidence that the assignment of traditional
gender stereotypes to the role of judge may be decaying over time, as
respondents appeared to care less about the gender of the judge and
more about the outcome of the case. This is exemplified by the results
shown in Figure 2 where the male trial judge was viewed as being more
influenced by his gender, while the female appellate judge was viewed
as being more influenced by her gender. This likely reflects a perception
by respondents that gender was influencing judicial decisionmaking in
this case when the judge's gender corresponded with the gender of the
winning litigant, rather than a broad perception that female judges are
more influenced by extralegal factors overall.
So, what was driving respondent perceptions if not the gender of
the judge? Our results show that on nearly every dimension we asked
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about, responses tended to reflect a correspondence between
respondents' own gender and the gender of the litigant in the case,
buttressing our conclusion that agreement with the case outcome rather
than gender stereotypes provides the strongest influence on
respondents' views. Regardless of whether the particular survey item
was asking solely about agreement with the case outcome or about
perceptions of extralegal influences on the judge's decision, responses
were almost uniformly more positive (or anti-extralegal influence) when
the gender of the litigant who benefited from the decision matched the
respondent's own gender. For example, in the treatments where a male
judge granted custody to the mother, male respondents were less likely
than female respondents to agree with the outcome of the case and more
likely to attribute the decision to gender and ideological influences. In
other words, gender matters, but it mattered in ways that were heavily
context dependent and less based on assigning traditional gender
stereotypes to judges.
While the focus of this study is on perceptions of bias based on
gender stereotypes, this last finding offers broader implications about
public perceptions of judicial decisionmaking more generally. In our
study, respondents overwhelmingly attributed extralegal influences to
the judge's decision when the outcome favored the litigant of the
opposite gender. We conjecture that this is likely generalizable to public
perceptions of judicial decisionmaking more broadly with individuals
showing a higher level of support for the premise that a judge decided
a case based on legal factors when that individual agreed with the
outcome.100
Broadly, our findings reflect previous research that illustrates
the influence of judge gender on public assessment of court outcomes is
conditional on a myriad of case specific and environmental factors.
While differences in overall levels of public support for court decisions
based on judge gender do not always emerge, scholars find that factors
such as regional differences among the public,101 and whether the
100. See, e.g., Badas, supra note 91, at 325 (supporting the notion that the outcome of a judicial
decision affects an individual's perception of how the judge decided the case).
101. See Boddery et al., supra note 57, at 22-24 (discussing the effect regional differences have
on responses to female- and male-authored court decisions). Professors Scott Boddery, Laura
Moyer, and Jeffrey Yates examine the way in which attribution of majority opinion authorship
affects how the public responds to a U.S. Supreme Court decision in a Fourth Amendment search
and seizure case. Initially, they find no statistically significant difference in levels of support for
majority opinions attributed to a male author (Justice Anthony Kennedy) versus a female author
(Justice Sandra Day O'Connor). Id. at 23. However, Boddery et al. find lower levels of support
when the opinion is attributed to a female author (when compared to an opinion attributed to the
Court) among Southern survey respondents. Id. at 24. Support for the female-authored majority
opinion was actually higher (when compared to a male-authored majority opinion) among non-
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female judge rules in a "substantively representative manner"102 (i.e.,
pro-woman position) can produce divergent agreement and responses to
court decisions. Our results also mirror existing research that finds
clear differences in the ways in which men and women respond to
political officials and gender differences in public opinion more
broadly.103
A few caveats must be taken into account. First, our survey
sample was limited to undergraduate college students. While some
scholars have provided evidence that the widespread criticism of the
"college sophomore problem" is exaggerated,104 it is possible that
changes in the use of gender stereotypes may reflect a change in values
in younger cohorts rather than a society-wide shift in such views. Yet,
even if we assume a lack of generalizability to a population of a broader
age range, this still provides evidence that traditional views on gender
roles are evolving. Second, it is unclear if these results would hold in a
case that did not have a clear female and male litigant role. While we
speculate that these results would be generalizable to cases involving
issues such as gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and abortion
rights, we are unsure how they would translate to cases where the
gender(s) of the litigant(s) was not apropos to the outcome. This is a
question that will hopefully be addressed by future research.
Although women are still underrepresented across nearly all
levels of government in the United States, and although gender gaps in
public opinion are still present, over time both men and women have
exhibited an increased willingness to support female candidates for
various political offices.105 While an abundance of studies have
examined how the public responds to female candidates and officials in
Southern survey respondents. Id. Boddery et al. attribute this result to the South's "traditionalistic
political culture," which is less favorable for female electoral candidates. Id. at 22.
102. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 258 (finding that female judges authoring pro-woman
decisions are viewed as more empathetic and less knowledgeable than their male counterparts).
103. See, e.g., PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 85; Dolan, Gender Differences, supra note 89; Dolan,
supra note 65; Herek, supra note 88; Lawless, supra note 64; Jennifer Wolak, Candidate Gender
and the Political Engagement of Women and Men, 43 AM. POL. RES. 872 (2015).
104. The "college sophomore problem" refers to a view that surveys of college students are not
generalizable to the broader population. Recent research has provided evidence that this criticism
may be vastly overstated. See, e.g., James N. Druckman & Cindy D. Kam, Students as
Experimental Participants: A Defense of the "Narrow Data Base," in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 65 (James N. Druckman et al. eds., 2011).
105. See, e.g., Anna Brown, The Data on Women Leaders, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/03/17/the-data-on-women-leaders/ [https://perma.cclZK3V-
H9R6] (documenting the increased representation of women in leadership positions over time);
Clare Malone, From 1937 to Hillary Clinton, How Americans Have Felt About a Woman President,
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executive and legislative positions, there is a surprising dearth of
research examining public response to judge gender and
decisionmaking, particularly at the state level. As more women join the
state and federal judiciary, the likelihood of encountering female judges
and their decisions becomes much more common. Although existing
research illustrates that female judges are subject to systematic biases
in terms of their professional evaluation, our analysis provides modest
evidence that gender-based assessment of state judges does not
necessarily dominate public support and approval of judicial
decisionmaking.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER BIAS
APPENDIX I: VIGNETTE AND SURVEY ITEMS
A. Vignette
All participants were given the following vignette. The first
name of the trial court judge, the first name of the family court judge,
and the issue (abortion/boyfriend) were each randomly assigned
according to a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design.
On Monday, in an opinion written by Justice (Lisa/David) Smith,
the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of a family
court judge, (Mary/John) Williams, granting custody to the father of an
eight-year-old child. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
family court judge had mistakenly considered the thirty-five-year-old
mother's (abortion/past relationship with a nineteen-year-old
boyfriend) as a sign of irresponsible decisionmaking.
In granting custody to the father, Judge (Mary/John) Williams
relied on factors (she/he) considered as evidence of a lack of judgment
by the mother. Most important was the judge's consideration of the
mother's abortion. In Judge (Mary/John) William's order, (she/he) wrote
"I'm concerned about the abortion. That was an irresponsible decision.
I am concerned about the environment."
In reversing the decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held this to be an inappropriate consideration. In Justice (Lisa/David)
Smith's majority opinion, (she/he) held that a parent's personal
behavior is only relevant when it has an effect on the child. Finding that
her abortion had no direct or indirect effect on her child, (she/he) ruled
that it was inappropriate for the family court to have considered it.
B. Survey Items
After reading the vignette, participants were given questions
about their support for the decisions, their views on the role of law and
ideology in the judges' decisions, their views on the role of gender as an
influence on the judges' decisions, and their views on the judges' level
of legal knowledge. The exact wording of the survey items is presented
below. The question categories did not appear in the survey given to
respondents, but are presented here for convenience.
> Support for Decision
o Thinking about the court decisions in the news bulletin,
how much would you say you agree or disagree with






* Neither agree nor disagree
* Somewhat disagree
* Strongly disagree
o Thinking about the court decisions in the news bulletin,
how much would you say you agree or disagree with
Judge (Mary/John) Williams' decision to consider the
mother's (prior abortion/past relationship with a
nineteen-year-old) in her decision?
* Strongly agree
* Somewhat agree
* Neither agree nor disagree
* Somewhat disagree -
* Strongly disagree
o Thinking about the court decisions in the news bulletin,
how much would you say you agree or disagree with
Justice (Lisa/David) Smith's majority opinion




* Neither agree nor disagree
* Somewhat disagree
* Strongly disagree
> Role of Law and Ideology
o Some people feel that judges base their rulings primarily
on their personal preference and ideology. Others argue
that judges primarily rely on the law when making their
court rulings. To what extent do you think Judge
(Mary/John) Williams based (her/his) custody decision on
(her/his) ideology and to what extent to do you think
Judge Williams based (her/his) custody decision on the
law?
* Decision was only based on personal ideology
* Decision was mostly based on personal ideology
* Decision was based equally on personal ideology
and the law
* Decision was mostly based on the law
* Decision was only based on the law
o Some people feel that judges base their rulings primarily
on their personal preference and ideology. Others argue
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that judges primarily rely on the law when making their
court rulings. To what extent do you think Justice
(Lisa/David) Smith, who authored the majority opinion
overturning Judge (Mary/John) Williams' custody
decision, based (her/his) decision on (her/his) ideology
and to what extent do you think Justice Smith based
(her/his) decision on the law?
* Decision was only based on personal ideology
* Decision was mostly based on personal ideology
* Decision was based equally on personal ideology
and the law
* Decision was mostly based on the law
* Decision was only based on the law
> Role of Gender
o Thinking about the court decisions in the news bulletin,
how much would you say you agree or disagree that the




* Neither agree nor disagree
* Somewhat disagree
* Strongly disagree
o Thinking about the court decisions in the news bulletin,
how much would you say you agree or disagree that the
gender of Justice (Lisa/David) Smith influenced (her/his)








o Thinking about the court decisions in the news bulletin,
how knowledgeable do you think Judge (Mary/John)






1880 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:6:1845
* Not knowledgeable at all
o Thinking about the court decisions in the news bulletin,
how knowledgeable do you think Justice (Lisa/David)
Smith, who wrote the majority opinion overturning





* Not knowledgeable at all
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APPENDIX II: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
A. Agreement with Consideration of Abortion/Boyfriend
Overall, respondents were much less likely to agree with the
trial judge's decision to consider the prior abortion than the prior
relationship with the nineteen-year-old boyfriend. As Figure 1A shows,
over 50% of respondents strongly disagreed with the trial judge's
consideration of the mother's prior abortion, and over 65% either
disagreed or strongly disagreed. Conversely, respondents' agreement
with the trial judge's consideration of the boyfriend was more
heterogeneous, as approximately 42% of respondents elected one of the
two disagree categories while another 42% either answered with agree
or strongly agree.
FIGURE 1A: DIFFERENCES IN AGREEMENT IN SUPPORT FOR
CONSIDERING ABORTION/BOYFRIEND
a}Abto If t. b) Bofien Tae
Interestingly, when these responses are broken down, we see
that neither judge gender nor respondent gender significantly impacts
respondent agreement with the trial judge's decision to consider the
mother's prior abortion or prior relationship with the nineteen-year-old
boyfriend. Mean responses for the level of agreement with the decision
to consider the abortion are almost the same when comparing groups
that received the male versus the female trial judge treatment (0.139,
p = 0.551). Similarly, agreement with the decision to consider the
boyfriend elicited similar mean responses regardless of whether the
respondents were in the male or female trial judge treatment group
(0.053, p = 0.788). Male respondents are slightly more likely to agree
with the judge's consideration of both the abortion and boyfriend, but
the differences are small and not statistically significant (0.300, p =
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0.301 for abortion treatment and 0.218, p = 0.332 for boyfriend
treatment).
While gender does not appear to impact agreement with the trial
judge's consideration of the mother's prior abortion or boyfriend, both
respondent party identification and self-identification as an evangelical
or "born-again" Christian do. Republican respondents' mean agreement
was nearly a full point lower (more to the agree side of the scale) than
Democrats with respect to the consideration of the prior abortion (0.847,
p = 0.003), and well over half a point lower with respect to consideration
of the boyfriend (0.635, p = 0.029). Likewise, evangelicals were much
more supporting of the decision to consider the abortion (0.709, p =
0.001). However, there was no discernable difference between
evangelicals and non-evangelicals with respect to consideration of the
boyfriend (0.049, p = 0.592).
B. Perceptions of Judge Knowledge
While not directly related to our primary hypotheses, we also
included questions about perceptions of judge knowledge in our survey
experiment to see if respondents found female judges to be less
knowledgeable than their male counterparts. Consistent with other
research,106 we find little overall difference in respondent perceptions of
judge knowledge based solely on the judge's gender. Not only do we not
see respondents perceiving female judges as less knowledgeable, but
the mean assessment of judge knowledge is actually slightly higher for
the female judge than the male judge at both the trial (0.077, p = 0.427)
and appellate court levels (0.150, p = 0.130), although neither is
statistically significant. Moreover, differences in perceptions of
knowledge based on judge gender remain statistically indistinguishable
from zero when looking only at male or female respondents. Moreover,
for the most part, there were no significant differences in perceptions of
knowledge when examining those respondents receiving the abortion
treatment only or the boyfriend treatment only. The single exception to
this observation was that respondents receiving the abortion treatment
perceive the female appellate judge to be nearly a quarter of a point
more knowledgeable on our five-point scale of judge knowledge, a
difference that is statistically significant at marginal levels (0.227, p
0.089).
106. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 258, 259 (finding that "the data does not suggest a direct
connection between the gender of the authoring judge and measures of legitimacy," while noting
that female judges are perceived as less knowledgeable than their male counterparts in certain
circumstances).
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Interestingly, there also appears to be little relationship
between respondents' agreement with the outcome of the case and their
opinion of the judge's level of legal knowledge. The correlation between
respondent agreement with the custody decision and perception of
judge knowledge is surprisingly low for both the trial (r = 0.250) and
appellate levels (r = 0.278). The correlation between agreement with the
custody decision and perceived knowledge never rises above 0.4, even
when looking solely at the responses of male respondents, female
respondents, those getting only the male judge treatment, those getting
only the female judge treatment, those getting only the abortion
treatment, or those getting only the boyfriend treatment. Only once
does the correlation even rise above 0.35 (appellate level, abortion
treatment only, r = 0.395).
FIGURE 2A: DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE
It is worth noting that respondents do consistently appear to
view the appellate judge as being more knowledgeable than the trial
judge. As Figure 2A shows, only slightly over 40% of respondents rated
the trial judge as being extremely knowledgeable or very knowledgeable
about the law, while nearly 70% classified the appellate judge into one
of those categories. This amounts to a nearly half a point difference in
the mean knowledgeability rating (0.467, p = 0.000), and this difference
remains relatively large and statistically significant when the data are
broken down by respondent gender, judge gender, and
abortion/boyfriend treatments.
C. Influence of Respondent Religion on Perceptions
In addition to gender, we felt it likely that other respondent
characteristics would influence agreement with case outcomes and
perceptions of extralegal influences on judicial decisionmaking. Given
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that abortion was a core issue in this case, respondent religion-or more
specifically, self-identification as an evangelical or "born-again"
Christian-was likely to have a strong conditional influence on
respondent attitudes. As expected, there is a clear division between
evangelicals and non-evangelicals regarding support for the custody
decision at both the trial and appellate level, and these differences are
highly conditional on the issue treatment. At the trial level,
evangelicals are significantly more likely to agree with the trial judge's
decision to grant custody to the father when given the abortion
treatment (0.411, p = 0.016), but when given the boyfriend treatment
there is essentially no difference between evangelicals and non-
evangelicals (0.093, p = 0.298). Additionally, this effect appears to be
further conditioned on the gender of the judge. Looking solely at the
abortion treatment, the difference in mean agreement between
evangelicals and non-evangelicals disappears when isolating those
receiving the male judge treatment (0.277, p = 0.177), but appears
stronger when looking only at those receiving the female judge
treatment (0.511, p = 0.019). There remains no significant difference in
mean responses between evangelicals and non-evangelicals receiving
the boyfriend treatment when looking separately at the male and
female judge.
At the appellate level the findings are nearly identical.
Evangelicals report significantly lower average agreement with the
appellate judge's custody decision than non-evangelicals when given
the abortion treatment (0.494, p = 0.005), and this effect is magnified
when looking only at those receiving the female appellate judge
treatment (0.687, p = 0.006). However, differences between evangelical
and non-evangelical support for the appellate judge's custody decision
are also statistically indistinguishable from zero when given the
boyfriend treatment (0.001, p = 0.499) or when looking only at those
receiving the male judge treatment, even when isolating abortion cases
(0.311, p = 0.131).
Turning to examine differences between evangelicals and non-
evangelicals with respect to perceptions of extralegal influences on
judicial decisionmaking, a few surprising observations appear. Looking
first at perceptions of gender influence on decisionmaking, there is no
significant difference between evangelicals and non-evangelicals with
respect to their belief as to whether gender influenced the
decisionmaking of the trial judge, but there are notable differences with
respect to the appellate judge. Surprisingly, evangelicals are overall
slightly less likely to think that gender influenced the appellate judge's
decisionmaking across all treatments (0.219, p = 0.053). Breaking this
down further, the average difference between evangelicals and non-
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evangelicals grows to nearly half a point when looking only at the male
judge treatment (0.454, p = 0.013), but disappears when looking at the
female judge treatment (0.095, p = 0.296). This difference is relatively
consistent when the data are further subset by issue area, with
evangelicals viewing the male judge as less likely to rely on gender in
his decisionmaking than non-evangelicals for either the abortion (0.413,
p = 0.074) or the boyfriend treatment (0.504, p = 0.042).
Looking at perceptions of ideological influences, we see some
similar patterns to those of gender effects. Evangelicals and non-
evangelicals again differ in their perceptions in systematic ways, but,
surprisingly, here it is also judge gender rather than abortion/boyfriend
treatment on which those differences are conditioned. Unlike with
perceptions of gender influences, here the differences between
evangelicals and non-evangelicals appear only at the trial judge level
and not at the appellate judge level. While there is a small difference in
mean responses across all treatments, with evangelicals more likely to
view the judge as relying upon the law than ideology (0.177, p = 0.038),
when broken down by judge gender, this difference disappears for those
respondents receiving the male judge treatment (0.122, p = 0.207), but
increases slightly for those receiving the female judge treatment (0.242,
p = 0.035). Interestingly, while only marginally significant, this latter
difference remains surprisingly consistent looking separately at the
abortion (0.212, p = 0.103) and boyfriend treatments (0.269, p = 0.096).
D. Influence of Respondent Party Identification on Perceptions
Much like religion and gender, clear differences emerged in
respondent answers based on their party identification at the trial
level.107 In terms of agreement with the case outcome, Republican
respondents were predictably more supportive of the grant of custody
to the father (0.401, p = 0.017). This difference remained at about the
same level when looking separately at those receiving the boyfriend
(0.384, p = 0.064) and abortion treatments (0.485, p = 0.025), although
the latter difference was somewhat stronger. These differences are also
consistent when looking separately at respondents receiving the male
judge treatment (0.515, p = 0.031) versus the female judge treatment
(0.288, p = 0.134); however, for the latter the difference is smaller and
fails to achieve statistical significance.
In contrast, differences between Democratic and Republican
respondents were somewhat less pronounced at the appellate level.
107. Due to the small number of Republicans in our sample, we are more cautious in drawing
strong inferences from these results.
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Here, Democrats were unsurprisingly more supportive of the appellate
court's custody decision; however, the difference in mean support was
much smaller than at the trial level and not statistically significant
(0.227, p = 0.111). This lack of a significant difference in agreement held
when subsetting by issue treatment as well. However, when looking
only at those respondents receiving the female judge treatment, the
difference became quite substantial (0.673, p = 0.008), suggesting a
conditional relationship between judge gender and party identification
that we cannot fully explore due to data limitations related to the small
number of Republicans in our sample.
Given this suggestion of a relationship between respondent
agreement with the custody decision and judge gender, it seems
plausible that Republican respondents may also think that gender was
a major influence on the decisionmaking of the judges. Interestingly,
the opposite appears to be true. Democratic respondents were
significantly more likely to think gender influenced the trial judge's
decisionmaking (0.649, p = 0.000). Moreover, this difference was
consistently strong when breaking down the data to look only at
respondents receiving the male judge treatment (0.591, p = 0.010), the
female judge treatment (0.689, p = 0.001), the abortion treatment
(0.778, p = 0.003), or the boyfriend treatment (0.556, p = 0.015). While
these findings are not completely counterintuitive, as Democrats could
simply be blaming extralegal influences for an outcome they did not
like, the fact that Democrats continue to see gender as an influence on
decisionmaking at a higher level than Republicans when we turn to the
appellate level is more difficult to explain. While only achieving
statistical significance at marginal levels, a nontrivial difference can be
seen between Democratic and Republican respondents' perceptions as
to whether the appellate judge was influenced by his or her gender
(0.284, p = 0.066). Additionally, this difference is even larger when
looking solely at those respondents receiving the male judge treatment
(0.566, p = 0.013) or the abortion treatment (0.414, p = 0.052). However,
the difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero for the female
judge and boyfriend treatments.
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